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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
mortgage was not dependent upon the existence of an actual creditor.
Had this more liberal interpretation been followed in the principal
case, the conditional sale contract would have been void as to the
trustee. Since the transfer had not been perfected under Washington
law prior to the date of bankruptcy, a creditor of the bankrupt whose
claim arose on that date could have obtained a lien on the property,
and the trustee has the rights of such a creditor, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists.
The interpretation of 70(c) given in the principal case fails
to strike a proper balance between the interests of the secured and
unsecured creditors of the bankrupt. If the principal case is followed,
70(c) would serve little useful purpose, since most transfers avoid-
able under 70(c) would be avoidable under 70(e), and where no
actual subsequent creditors are in existence, secret liens or invalid
transfers would be permitted to deplete the assets of the estate
to the detriment of the general creditors. The proper balance would
be struck, however, if the existence of an actual creditor were re-
quired only under Section 70(e). 70(e) could be used to avoid
any lien or transfer voidable by an actual creditor of the bankrupt
regardless of when the transaction was perfected. 70(c) could then
be used to avoid any lien or transfer not perfected as of the date of
bankruptcy whether or not an actual creditor exists who could have
obtained a lien.
Harold Dale Brewster, Jr.
Criminal Law-Presence of Accused at Trial
D was convicted of statutory rape. At the trial, while instruc-
tions were being discussed, D voluntarily left the judge's chambers.
His absence was discovered within four or five minutes. The judge
suspended the proceedings and upon D's return, the discussion of
instructions resumed. On appeal, D maintained that his absence
constituted reversible error. Held, reversed, new trial awarded.
W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 2 (Michie 1961), requires that "a
person indicted for felony shall be personally present during the
trial therefor. . . ." The statute is mandatory and the right of the
accused is inalienable. State v. Vance, 124 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va.
1962).
The concern regarding presence at trial reached its climax in
West Virginia in the instant case. The court reluctantly reversed
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the conviction and did so on purely technical grounds. It was said
that any liberalization of the statute must come from the Legislature
and not from the courts. Until an amendment, it must be presumed
that the court's strict interpretation gives effect to the legislative
intent at the time of the enactment of the statute. A fervid dissent
in the principal case took the position that the West Virginia court
is needlessly being consistent with a rule that no longer has a basis.
The "personally present" rule has its origin in common law.
In English history, a prisoner in a felony trial had no right to the
advice and assistance of counsel. The accused was required to
defend himself and it was held that he must be present in court
when any step was taken in his case, regardless of how insignificant
it was. The old English cases were very strictly followed in the
early decisions in America. In adhering to this rule the legislatures
and courts lost sight of the reason upon which it was founded.
Lehman, A Critical Survey of Certain Phases of Trial Procedure In
Criminal Cases, 63 U. PA. L. REv. 609, 619 (1915).
The first Virginia case to take cognizance of the rule was
Sperry v. Commonwealth, 9 Leigh 623 (1838). The court said that
the rules applicable in England to trials for felonies were, in general,
equally applicable in Virginia. A person accused of felony must be
arraigned and must plead in person. It was required that the ac-
cused personally appear in all the subsequent proceedings. The
rule became a statute in 1849. Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 30
Gratt. 845, 850 (1878), held that the statute was declaratory of
common law.
West Virginia, from the first years of statehood, has applied
the rule with the strictness of the old English courts and the early
Virginia cases. See 45 W. VA. L.Q. 82 (1938), for a compilation
of West Virginia cases.
The court had two possible alternatives in the instant case.
It could have narrowed the interpretation of the word "trial" or
considered D's voluntary absence as a waiver of his right to be
present at that particular stage of the trial. If the court had taken
the first course, it would have been necessary to repudiate State v.
Howerton, 100 W. Va. 501, 130 S.E. 655 (1925). In the Hower-
ton case, instructions were argued and acted upon by the trial court
in the absence of the accused. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held reversible error.
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In Brown v. Maryland, 225 Md. 349, 170 A.2d 300 (1961),
D was not present at the argument of instructions. After instruc-
tions were read to the jury, counsel, in the presence of D, was asked
if there were any exceptions. None were given. On appeal, D
relied on State v. Howerton, supra, because article 5 of Maryland's
Declaration of Rights has been construed as giving the accused the
right to be present at every stage of his trial. Held, conviction af-
firmed. The Maryland court pointed out that the West Virginia
court in the Howerton case cited State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702,
703, 82 S.E. 1019 (1914) as holding "The statute stands as it
stood in the Virginias for years. . . ." Yet, Virginia arrived at an
opposite conclusion less than three weeks before the Howerton case
was decided. Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 130 S.E. 398
(1925).
The Palmer and the Howerton cases are factually similar. In
the former, the court had adjourned for the day. Counsel, without
D's presence, argued instructions before the judge. The following
day, the judge made his decision on the instructions, and in the
presence of D, gave them to the jury. The Virginia court held that
the argument of instructions was suspension of the trial and the
court was not in session. It was said that the accused must be
present at every stage of the trial proper, emphasis being placed on
presence when anything is done which can affect the interest of the
accused. The West Virginia court has refused to apply the statute
when it considered the acts as not part of the trial. State v. McHajfa,
110 W. Va. 266, 157 S.E. 595 (1931). However, when given two
factually similar cases, the West Virginia and Virginia courts took
contrary positions. The statutes are derived from a common source,
yet West Virginia's is applied with more severity.
The second alternative would be a waiver of D's rights. In
State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S.E. 811 (1912), the court
reversed a conviction because the accused was not present when
his counsel argued a motion to exclude state's evidence. The
prisoner was sent for, and his counsel was requested by the Judge
to repeat his argument in the prisoner's presence but counsel de-
clined to do so. The dissent in the Sutter case set forth an interesting
problem. In many instances, counsel are called to the bench and
neither the accused nor the jury can hear what is transpiring. In
those instances the prisoner is present, technically speaking, but he
is just as much ignorant of what is going on as someone in the
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next room. It was the dissent's opinion that no court would be
so technical so as to reverse a decision in such a case.
There is no constitutional question involved in waiver. In
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1933), D was convicted of
murder. He was not present when the jury viewed the scene. Mr.
Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority, said that there is no
ruling of the United States Supreme Court which assures the privilege
of presence when presence would be useless. The Court said con-
fusion of thought results when there is a failure to distinguish be-
tween requirements of presence that have their source at common
law and requirements that have their presence in the federal con-
stitution. The privilege of presence is not to be confused with the
privilege of confrontation of witnesses in a trial.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in the principal
case, has made it clear that if any liberalization is to come in this
area, it will have to come from the Legislature. The following
methods of procedure are possibilities. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that the presence of the defendant is required
at arraignment and at every stage of the trial, except as otherwise
provided by the rules. If the offense is not punishable by death,
the defendant's voluntary absence after trial has begun in his presence
shall not prevent continuing the trial. FED. R. CrM. P. 43. The
American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure offers another
basis for legislation. If the defendant voluntarily absents himself,
except at his arraignment and when a plea of guilty is made, the
proceedings may be had in his absence if the court so orders. ALI
CODE, ClUM. P. § 287 (1931).
Until some change is made, the state's criminal procedure is
unduly impeded. No conflict of thought exists regarding the problems
that this extreme technical point presents. The conflict exists only
as to the method of correction. Without the desired legislation, the
West Virginia courts will continue to reverse convictions on a rule,
with its present interpretation, that no longer has a basis and which
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